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Abstract
This note analyzes consumption risk sharing among the EU−15 countries. It is found that the
reaction of consumption growth rates to idiosyncratic income growth is too sensitive to be
consistent with perfect risk sharing. Some evidence is presented in favor the hypothesis that
institutional and legal aspects determine the amount of risk sharing a country can achieve. In
particular, countries characterized by high levels of investor protection appear to achieve less
consumption insurance.
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A central theme of international business cycle models is that if investors have
access to markets for ﬁnancial assets that are complete, then they can perfectly
insure against country speciﬁc shocks. That is, consumption should only react
to aggregate shocks that are uninsurable and consequently, one should observe
that consumption is highly correlated across countries. Moreover, even if a com-
plete set of contingent markets is not available, risk sharing is still possible either
through a ﬁscal transfer system or through existing ﬁnancial markets, e.g. cross-
country ownership of productive assets, or trade in non-contingent assets. How-
ever, the empirical literature has largely rejected the implications of the theoretical
models with complete markets, indicating that the amount of risk sharing is rather
limited.1 Backus et al. (1992) ﬁnd that the consumption correlations are too small
in the data to be consistent with complete markets. French and Poterba (1991)
document a large home bias in equity holdings and therefore only a small degree
of international diversiﬁcation. In addition, consumption appears to be too sensi-
tive to idiosyncratic income to be consistent with perfect risk sharing as shown by
Canova and Ravn (1996) and Lewis (1996) among others.
This paper is an empirical study of the relationship between ﬁnancial market
institutions and risk sharing among the EU-15 countries using the methodology
advocated by Asdrubali et al. (1996). More speciﬁcally, it is tested whether the
exposure of consumption allocations to country speciﬁc risks is related to ﬁnan-
cial market characteristics, that inﬂuence the enforceability of contracts. This is
partially motivated by Kehoe and Perri (2002) who build a model that can gen-
erate consumption correlations that are smaller than output correlations. In their
model, it is assumed that international loans are imperfectly enforceable. Hence
any country can renege on its debt and as a consequence will be punished by
exclusion from international ﬁnancial markets.
Itisfoundthatthehypothesisofperfectrisksharingamongthecountriesunder
consideration is strongly rejected due to the sensitivity of consumption growth
to idiosyncratic income growth. Moreover, the results indicate that institutional
and legal aspects inﬂuence the amount of consumption insurance a country can
achieve. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that countries characterized by a high
degree of investor protection are in general more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks.
This result is consistent with the idea that investors in countries that provide good
investor protection prefer to invest domestically and will diversify country speciﬁc
risks to a limited extent.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the
theoretical motivation and the empirical speciﬁcation used in the paper. Section 3
1For a survey see Lewis (1999).
1presents the results and section 4 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Motivation and Empirical Implemen-
tation
Empirical studies of risk sharing are usually based on a central implication of
models with complete markets, namely that the representative agents’ intertem-
poral rates of substitution have to be equalized across countries. This result im-
plies that under complete markets, the ex-post consumption growth rates of any
two countries should be perfectly correlated. Thus, consumption growth, although
individually stochastic, is fully determined by aggregate consumption growth.
Moreover, idiosyncratic variables, in particular idiosyncratic income, should
not inﬂuence relative consumption growth. Put differently, the inﬂuence of id-
iosyncratic shocks is diversiﬁed away. On the other hand, if a complete set of
Arrow Debreu securities is not available, consumption growth rates are likely to
respond to shocks to idiosyncratic variables. For instance if agents face borrow-
ing constraints or follow rule of thumb behavior as emphasized by Campbell and
Mankiw (1990) and Bayoumi (1997), consumption growth will depend on id-




t + β1(∆logyit − ∆logy
a
t) + eit, (1)
where cit,ca
t,yit, and ya
t denotes real per capita consumption of country i, aggre-
gate consumption, per capita output and aggregate output. β0 and β1 are coefﬁ-
cients and eit is an error term.
Idiosyncratic output growth is proxied by the term ∆logyit − ∆logya
t. Sub-
tracting aggregate output growth eliminates global shocks to some extent and
helps to reduce the amount of multicollinearity among the right hand side vari-
ables. Testing the joint hypothesis that β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 constitutes a test of
perfect risk sharing. Equations similar to (1) have been estimated by Cochrane
(1991) and Mace (1991) with micro data and by Lewis (1996) with international
data.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) suggest to interpret β1 as the fraction of shocks that is
not smoothed. Deﬁne ˜ yit ≡ yit/ya
t as the ratio of country i income to aggregate in-
come and similarly ˜ cit ≡ cit/ca
t as the ratio of country i consumption to aggregate
consumption. The argument is based on the following identity: ˜ yit = (˜ yit/˜ cit)˜ cit.
Taking logarithms and ﬁrst differences of this identity gives:
∆log ˜ yit = (∆log ˜ yit − ∆log˜ cit) + ∆log˜ cit. (2)
2Multiplying both sides of (2) by ∆log ˜ yit, subtracting the means from both sides
and taking expectations results in
var(∆log ˜ yit) = cov(∆log ˜ yit − ∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit) +
cov(∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit), (3)
where var and cov denote the variance and covariance in the cross section. Divid-
ing by var(∆logyit) gives:
1 =
cov(∆log ˜ yit − ∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit)
var(∆log ˜ yit)
+
cov(∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit)
var(∆log ˜ yit)
. (4)
Note that cov(∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit) = 0 corresponds to perfect risk sharing since
consumption growth is uncorrelated with income growth in this case. However,
if cov(∆log˜ cit,∆log ˜ yit) > 0, then risk sharing is limited since consumption
growth comoves with income growth. Thus, the second term on the right hand
side can be interpreted as a measure of the fraction of shocks that is not smoothed.
Note furthermore that this measure of risk sharing is equal to the ordinary least
squares estimate of β1 in (1) after imposing the restriction β0 = 1.
3 Results
The Data used in this paper is annual and covers the period 1960 - 2002. The
sample includes the EU-15 countries with the exception of Luxembourg, which
is excluded due to limited data availability. Series on real per capita consumption
and real per capita GDP are taken from the database of the European Commis-
sion. The estimation allows for country-ﬁxed effects. Aggregate consumption
and output are calculated as population weighted averages. In order to account
for autocorrelation, it is assumed that the error term follows an AR(1) process
for each country. All reported test statistics and signiﬁcance levels are calculated
from White corrected covariance matrices.
Results from the estimation of (1) are presented in Table 1. The estimate of
β0 is 0.9 and therefore close to what models with complete markets predict. The
null β0 = 1 cannot be rejected at the 10 percent level. However, the estimate of β1
is signiﬁcantly greater than zero and consequently domestic consumption growth
reacts to idiosyncratic income growth, which contradicts perfect risk sharing. The
null hypothesis of perfect consumption risk sharing, that is the joint hypothesis
that β0 = 1 and β1 = 0 is rejected at a high level of signiﬁcance.
As discussed in Section 2, the coefﬁcient on idiosyncratic income growth can
be interpreted as the fraction of shocks that is not smoothed. Thus, approximately
335 percent of idiosyncratic income shocks are smoothed among the countries in-
cluded in the analysis. This is slightly below what Sorensen and Yosha (1999) re-
port. They ﬁnd that about 40 percent of income shocks are smoothed.2 Asdrubali
et al. (1996) ﬁnd that risk sharing among US states is considerably higher. In par-
ticular, about 75 percent of idiosyncratic income shocks are smoothed among the
states in the US.
Next, it will be examined whether institutional aspects and in particular char-
acteristics of a country’s legal system related to investor protection can help to
explain the rejection of risk sharing. Kehoe and Perri (2002) who demonstrate
that a model with incomplete markets due to enforcement problems can generate
cross country consumption correlations that are much closer to the data than a
model with complete markets would predict.
Moreover, inaseriesofpapers, LaPortaetal.(1997,1998)arguethatﬁnancial
systems are to a large degree determined by the legal framework. Since the risk-
return relationship that investors base their decisions on is likely to depend on the
characteristics of the ﬁnancial system and consequently also on legal aspects, it
seems plausible that legal systems also determine the amount of risk sharing that
can be achieved. In addition, a certain degree of sophistication of the domestic
ﬁnancial system might be needed to fully exploit the gains from international asset
trade. To the extent that institutional aspects also determine the development and
sophistication of ﬁnancial markets this provides another channel through which
international risk sharing might be inﬂuenced.
In order to internationally diversify domestic risks, foreign investors must be
willing to buy domestic assets and vice versa. However, countries with poor in-
vestor protection may not be able to sell assets abroad, which will reduce the
amount of risk sharing that can be achieved through international ﬁnancial mar-
kets. Moreover, a low level of investor protection can lead to less international
diversiﬁcation of domestic portfolios since domestic investors have an incentive
to become controlling investors at home in order to protect their rights. Al-
though countries with good investor protection should be able to attract foreign
investors, international diversiﬁcation might also be difﬁcult to achieve since do-
mestic agents might not be willing to invest in countries where investor rights
are poorly protected.3 Thus, whether countries with good investor protection are
characterized by more or less exposure to idiosyncratic risks is ambiguous.
The empirical strategy will be to augment (1) with interaction terms that cap-
ture the inﬂuence of the variables under consideration on the exposure to idiosyn-
cratic income growth. The restriction β0 = 1 is imposed in the following estima-
2Their sample consists of only eight EU member countries and the sample period is slightly
different.
3See Giannetti and Koskinen (2003).
4tions in order to allow for an interpretation according to Asdrubali et al. (1996).
The following speciﬁcation will be used:
∆logcit − ∆logc
a
t = αi + β(∆logyit − ∆logy
a
t)Xit + eit, (5)
where Xit is a vector containing variables that allow to group countries according
to institutional and legal characteristics of their ﬁnancial markets and β is a vector
of coefﬁcients.
The additional data used in this Section is from La Porta et al. (1998) who
construct indices that can be used as proxies for investor protection.
The ﬁrst variable analyzed is the creditor rights index, CRi. This index takes
on higher values when it is rather easy for creditors to take possession of collat-
eral in case of default. That is, larger values of this index imply more rights for
creditors. Let CR1i be a dummy that takes on the value one if CRi < 2 and zero
otherwise. The dummies CR2, CR3, are deﬁned similarly, CR2i = 1 if CRi = 2
and CR3i = 1 if CRi > 2.
Equation (5) is estimated with Xit = (CR1i,CR2i,CR3i). The second col-
umn of Table 2 shows the results. Somewhat surprisingly, it appears that countries
that offer good protection for creditors are characterized by a higher exposure to
idiosyncratic shocks. For countries characterized by a value of the creditor rights
index of at most one, the point estimate for the risk sharing coefﬁcient is 0.64. Put
differently, 36 percent of idiosyncratic shocks are smoothed. For countries in the
medium range, this fraction decreases to 20 percent, and for countries with the
best protection for creditors, the null of no risk sharing can not be rejected.
The hypothesis that all countries achieve the same amount of risk sharing can
be rejected at a high level of signiﬁcance. However, equality of the coefﬁcients
cannot be rejected for countries falling within the ﬁrst two categories. Thus it ap-
pearsthataccordingtothetherelationshipbetweencreditorrightsandrisksharing
countries can be classiﬁed into two groups, where better investor protection is as-
sociated with a higher fraction of uninsured shocks.
TheremainingcolumnsofTable2repeattheestimationwithcountriesgrouped
according to the shareholder rights index, SRi. A high value of this index indi-
cates that shareholders ﬁnd it less difﬁcult to vote out directors. The dummy
variables SR1,SR2,SR3 are deﬁned analogously to the ones used in the previ-
ous exercise. Again, countries with institutional frameworks that provide good
protection for shareholders appear to be more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks.
Overall, it seems that the sensitivity of consumption growth to idiosyncratic
income growth and therefore to the amount of risk sharing that can be achieved is
indeedrelatedtothequalityofinvestorprotectionandthereforetotheenforceabil-
ity of contracts. In particular, countries that provide good protection for investors
seem to be more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. A possible explanation could
5be a more pronounced home bias in countries with good investor protection. Gi-
annetti and Koskinen (2003) argue that investors from countries with institutions
that provide good investor protection are not willing to invest in countries that
provide poorer protection. Hence, investors in countries with good investor pro-
tection hold portfolios that are biased towards domestic assets, which also limits
the amount of insurance against country speciﬁc shocks that can be achieved.
Asanadditionalanalysis, theestimationwillberepeatedwithcountriesgrouped
according to either the quality of their system of legal enforcement, the enforce-
ment of insider trading laws and accounting standards. La Porta et al. (1998)
argue that a strong system of legal enforcement could substitute for low investor
protection. They calculate an index that can be used as a proxy for the quality
of enforcement. In order to group countries according to this index, a dummy
variable, denoted by EFi is used that takes on the value one if the enforcement
index for country i is above the mean of the enforcement index and zero other-
wise. Next, countries are grouped according to whether insider trading laws are
enforced, which appears to be another important aspect of investor protection.
Let INit be a dummy that takes on the value one if insider trading laws are en-
forced. Accounting standards are also considered, since low accounting standards
might impose considerable information costs. Countries are grouped according to
whether they have above or below average accounting standards. ACi is a dummy
that takes on the value one if the index for accounting standard from La Porta et al.
(1998) is above average for country i and zero otherwise.
Table 3 displays the results for these three variables. In general, the results
from Table 2 are conﬁrmed. Countries characterized either by a strong system
of legal enforcement, the enforcement of insider trading laws or good accounting
standards have consumption allocations that tend to be more exposed to idiosyn-
cratic shocks. However, equality of the coefﬁcients across countries cannot be
rejected for INit.
Finally, the estimation is repeated with the original variables included in Xit
instead of the dummies. This allows to incorporate all the information available
in the various indices. Table 4 shows the results. Basically, the ﬁndings from the
earlier regressions are conﬁrmed. The coefﬁcients on all interaction terms have
positive signs, indicating that an increase in the respective proxy for investor pro-
tection also increases the exposure to idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, higher levels
of investor protection are associated with a higher fraction of uninsured shocks.
However, it turns out that only the interaction terms involving the creditor rights
index and the quality of enforcement are signiﬁcantly greater than zero. Share-
holder rights and in particular accounting standards do not appear to play a role.
64 Summary and Conclusion
This paper analyzes international risk sharing among EU countries. First, it is
found that the extent of consumption risk sharing is substantially smaller than
among states in US which conﬁrms results previously reported in the literature.
Next, it is explored whether the amount of consumption risk sharing is related
toinstitutionalandlegalaspectsthatdetermineacountry’sﬁnancialsystem. Some
indications are found that this is indeed the case. The estimation results suggest
that countries with good institutions in the sense of good investor protection tend
to be more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. This is particularly true for countries
with good protection for creditors and a highly efﬁcient legal system. A potential
explanation for this result is the argument presented in Giannetti and Koskinen
(2003) according to which good investor protection might induce a home bias
and could therefore reduce the amount of consumption risk sharing that can be
achieved.
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p − val(H0 : β0 = 0,β1 = 1) 0.00
Notes to Table 1: Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors and test statistics are calculated
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11Table 4: Institutional Variables and Risk Sharing.
X = (SR,CR,AC,EF,1)
β1 0.0553 (0.0481)
β2 0.0849 * (0.0465)
β3 0.0007 (0.0045)
β4 0.0712 ** (0.0314)
β5 -0.2203 (0.2698)
Adj. R2 0.43
Notes to Table 3: Standard errors in parenthesis. Standard errors are calculated with White
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix. ∗∗ and ∗ stand for 5% and 10% signiﬁcant.
Due to limited data availability, Ireland is excluded from the estimation.
12